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This paper uses data from the Health and Retirement Study to explore the mechanism that underlies
the robust relation found in the literature between cognitive ability, and in particular numeracy, and
wealth, income constant. We have a number of findings. First, the more valuable the pension, the more
knowledgeable are covered workers about their pensions. We suggest that causality is more likely
to run from pension wealth to pension knowledge, rather than the other way around. Second, most
measures of cognitive ability, including numeracy, are not significant determinants of pension and
Social Security knowledge. Third, standardizing for incomes and other factors, a pension of higher
value does not substitute for other forms of wealth. Rather, counting pensions in total wealth, those
with more valuable pensions save more for retirement, other things the same. Fourth, there is no evidence
that wealth held outside of pensions is influenced by knowledge of pensions. 
In sum, numeracy does not influence wealth in whole or in part by affecting financial knowledge of
one's pension plan, where financial knowledge of the pension then influences other decisions about
retirement saving.
These findings raise questions about the mechanism that underlies the relation between cognition,
especially numeracy, and wealth. From a policy perspective, they suggest that the numeracy-wealth
relation should not be taken as evidence that increasing financial literacy will increase the wealth of


















Pensions and Social Security together account for half the wealth of those approaching 
retirement age. Thus one would expect knowledge of pensions and Social Security to play a central 
role in shaping the financial decisions made by those in their early to mid-fifties. In addition, recent 
studies confirm a link between numeracy and household wealth (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2006; Banks 
and Oldfield, 2007). Indeed, measures of numeracy, based on simple questions testing the ability to 
calculate fractions, percentages and compounding, seem to dominate more elaborate measures of 
cognition in explaining the wealth of those approaching retirement age (McArdle, Smith and Willis, 
2009)
2. Thus one would suspect there is a link between numeracy and knowledge of pensions and 
Social Security, so that, holding the influence of cognition on earnings constant, each plays a role in 
shaping the accumulation of retirement wealth. 
To learn more about these potential relationships, we use the Health and Retirement Study 
to create a number of measures of knowledge of pensions and Social Security. We then demonstrate 
that knowledge of pensions is higher where the value of the pension is higher. Next we consider the 
relation of cognition to pension knowledge, with special emphasis on the role played by numeracy. 
Following that, we relate wealth held outside of pensions and Social Security to measures of 
                                                 
 
2 McArdle, Smith and Willis describe a set of measures of the various dimensions of cognitive ability being 
developed as part of an ongoing survey that is complementary to the Health and Retirement Study. Their research 
focuses on measures of cognition taken directly from the psychology literature, including measures of the stock of 
accumulated knowledge (crystallized intelligence) and the dimensions of cognitive ability associated with processing 
decisions (fluid intelligence).  
The measures of cognition from their new survey are not yet available in a sample that also includes detailed 
measures of pension and Social Security wealth from respondents and employers, allowing development of an array of 
measures of pension and Social Security knowledge. Both sets of measures will eventually be available for the HRS 
once the 2010 wave is returned from the field and the respondent information from that wave is supplemented by 
administrative data. The 2010 wave includes the new set of cognition questions, detailed questions about pensions and 
Social Security, and eventually will have matched employer produced pension plan descriptions and Social Security 
earnings histories. Right now, however, detailed measures of cognition are only available for a small share of the HRS 
population in an experimental module.  
Therefore, we proceed by using the less elaborate measures of numeracy and other dimensions of cognition 
that are currently available in the HRS.  These same measures are used by McArdle, Smith and Willis (2009) in a 
portion of their paper. (Also see Ofstedal, Fisher and Herzog, 2005). Supporting this decision, their work suggests that 
in explaining wealth, the more elaborate measures of cognition are dominated by simple measures of numeracy, which 
are available to us.   2
cognition, including numeracy, to measures of knowledge of pensions and Social Security, and to 
wealth accumulated in the form of pensions. We consider the relationship to total wealth as well. 
In some respects, our analysis conforms to our expectations. In other respects, it generates 
surprises, and more disturbing, inconsistencies that are difficult to square with simple stories of the 
demand for and effects of knowledge on economic decision making. To be more specific: 
We are able to generate a number of measures of pension and Social Security knowledge 
indicating knowledge of plan type, age of eligibility for retirement benefits and benefit amounts. 
Some of the measures of pension knowledge are directly related to pension wealth; the 
more valuable the pension, the more knowledgeable the covered worker. Apparently, those whose 
pensions are valuable enough to make it worthwhile to understand them are more likely to be 
knowledgeable about their pensions. Moreover, most pension wealth held by those in their early and 
mid-fifties is in defined benefit plans. Given the wage premium paid on these jobs and the history of 
changes in these plans, causality is more likely to run from pension wealth to pension knowledge, 
rather than the other way around. So far, so good. 
A first puzzle is that most measures of cognitive ability, including numeracy, are not 
significant determinants of pension and Social Security knowledge. 
A second puzzle is related to findings by previous researchers and confirmed in our earlier 
work with HRS data (Cagan, 1965; Katona, 1965; Gustman and Steinmeier, 1999). The amount of 
wealth a household accumulates outside of pensions and Social Security does not decline as the 
value of the household's pension wealth increases, income constant. That is, standardizing for 
individual differences such as time preference, pensions do not seem to be a substitute for other 
forms of wealth. As a result, counting pensions in total wealth, those with pensions save more for 
retirement. The hypothesis set forth by earlier researchers is that pensions lead to greater 
understanding of the mechanics of saving and a greater appreciation of the need for retirement   3
saving. This suggests that wealth held outside of pensions should be related to knowledge of 
pensions. But we can find no evidence in support of that relationship. 
A third and related puzzle is that knowledge of pensions has no effect on the relation of 
cognition to wealth. We duplicate results from McArdle, Smith and Willis (2009) indicating that 
there is a relation between cognition, and in particular numeracy, and wealth held outside of 
pensions and Social Security. However, once we find that knowledge of pensions and Social 
Security is not strongly related to the wealth accumulated by the retirement age population, and 
knowledge of pensions and Social Security is not related to cognition, it follows, and we find, that 
inclusion of pension knowledge in wealth equations does not affect the estimated relation between 
numeracy and wealth. So we must conclude that numeracy does not influence wealth in whole or in 
part by affecting financial knowledge of one's pension plan, where financial knowledge of the 
pension then influences other decisions about retirement saving. 
These findings not only raise questions about the role of knowledge of pensions and Social 
Security in shaping retirement saving, but they also raise questions about the linkage between 
numeracy and wealth. Not whether there is one -- the evidence supports the existence of such a link. 
The question is how it works. We had thought that one avenue through which numeracy influences 
wealth is through an effect on understanding of financial instruments. But no financial instrument is 
more crucial to retirement saving than pensions and Social Security. So we are left with the 
question, what is the channel through which numeracy affects wealth accumulated by the age of 
retirement? 
To set the stage for the empirical analysis, Section II provides further discussion of the role 
that knowledge of pensions and Social Security may play in influencing the relation of cognition to 
wealth. In Section III we discuss the construction of the measures of pension knowledge, cognition 
and wealth used in the analysis. Section IV analyzes the relation of measures of knowledge of   4
pensions and Social Security to measures of cognition. Section V analyzes first individually, and 
then jointly, the relation of measures of knowledge of pensions and Social Security, and cognition, 
to retirement wealth. Section VI concludes.  
II. An Intermediary Role for Knowledge of Pensions and Social Security? 
A. Cognition and Knowledge of Pensions and Social Security 
If higher cognitive ability leads to a greater appreciation of the need for retirement saving, 
or to more effective saving for retirement, one might also expect higher cognitive ability to be 
accompanied by greater knowledge of the instruments used in saving for retirement. Pensions and 
Social Security account for half of the wealth of U.S. households nearing retirement age.  
One possibility is that those with higher cognitive ability have greater knowledge of 
pensions and of Social Security, which may contribute to their accumulating greater wealth. Even if 
there is no direct causality running from cognition through knowledge of pensions and Social 
Security to wealth, one would expect at least an indirect association where, holding measures of 
income constant, those with highest levels of cognition accumulate greater wealth because they 
recognize the need for retirement saving, and at the same time accrue greater knowledge of 
financial instruments.  
An indirect linkage might also arise if numeracy leads to increased planning activities, 
which in turn affect wealth (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2007). Once again, through this route one might 
also expect to find numeracy linked to knowledge of the two most important sources of financial 
wealth at retirement age, pensions and Social Security.  
B. Knowledge of Pensions and the Level of Non-Pension, Non-Social Security Wealth.  
In Gustman and Steinmeier (1999) we found support for earlier findings by Cagan (1965) 
and Katona (1965) regarding the relation of pensions to saving. Contrary to the view that pensions 
are a simple, tax favored substitute for other forms of saving, data from the 1992 HRS suggested   5
that pension coverage and pension values bear very little relation to saving outside of pensions. That 
is, those with pensions save roughly the same amount outside of their plans as do those without 
pensions who have comparable lifetime incomes. Where there is some substitution between 
pensions and other forms of wealth, it is only for those with higher levels of income and education. 
For the rest, there is little apparent substitution of pensions for other wealth, even holding constant a 
number of factors that might reflect differences in taste for saving. Partly, this is because an 
important fraction of the population does not save for retirement outside of pensions and Social 
Security. But of greater interest, even for those who do save in other forms, in many cases there is 
little substitution. So those with pensions typically have higher total wealth than those without 
pensions, income and other factors the same.  
It is important to standardize for incomes when investigating the pension-wealth relation. 
Jobs offering a pension also offer higher wages (Gustman and Steinmeier, 1993.) But even when we 
did standardize for lifetime incomes, the positive link between pensions and wealth continued.  
Another possible reason for a pension-wealth relation has been suggested by Cagan (1965) 
and Katona (1965). Their idea is that those with pensions may have been made more aware of the 
need for retirement saving, and so saved more. It certainly is in the interest of employers to insure 
that covered workers appreciate the contributions they are making to the workers' pensions. But if 
the linkage between pensions and other wealth stemmed from the greater understanding of the need 
for retirement saving by those with pensions, one would also expect to find a relationship between 
knowledge of pension plans and saving in other forms. This will lead to one of the major 
hypotheses we will be testing. If Cagan and Katona were right, we should find that greater 
knowledge of pensions is associated with higher wealth accumulated outside of the pension, income 
constant.   6
Still another possibility is that those with higher values of time preference may find 
pensions an imperfect substitute for wealth in hand. But in our earlier work, we could find no 
evidence that time preference was driving the relation between pensions and other forms of wealth.   
C. Pension Knowledge and Total Wealth 
What might account for the lack of a relationship between knowledge of pensions and 
Social Security on the one hand, and retirement wealth on the other? There is evidence that many of 
those with pensions are disengaged from the management of their plans. Most pensions held by 
those in their fifties are defined benefit plans. Even among those with substantial balances in 
defined contribution plans, many never rebalance their portfolios. Others rebalance infrequently, 
even during the course of a recession. Many are not aware of the details of their plans. Many do not 
focus until they are very near their retirement ages. Thus the lack of a relation between pension 
knowledge and total wealth, earnings constant, may simply reflect the disengagement of those with 
pensions from the management of their plans. But why then would they be so aware of the need to 
accumulate wealth held in other forms than pensions and Social Security? People handle other 
forms of wealth more frequently. Thus cognition, and in particular numeracy, may affect the value 
of other forms of wealth as long as people are paying more attention to, and are engaged in 
transactions involving these other forms of wealth. But would this attention to other wealth be the 
same for those with and without pensions? 
In trying to understand the relationship between pension knowledge and total wealth, there 
is another puzzle. In exploring measures of pension knowledge similar to those reported here, 
Gustman and Steinmeier (2001) found that respondents to the Health and Retirement Study who 
overestimated the values of their pensions and Social Security in a base year, 1992, did not 
eventually change their saving or retirement behavior in future years, by saving more or delaying 
their retirement relative to their initial plans. Nor did those who had understated their plan values   7
change their behavior, taking advantage of the unexpected excess in assets to save less in 
subsequent years, or to retire earlier than previously planned.  
D. The Relation of Cognition to Wealth 
In attempting to understand the relation of cognitive ability to wealth, it is important to 
realize that there need not be a statistical relationship. Additional cognitive ability might raise 
earnings, but holding earnings constant, greater cognitive ability may or may not be associated with 
the accumulation of additional wealth. Higher cognitive ability may reduce mistakes people make in 
choosing how much to save for retirement, but those mistakes might have resulted in either over 
saving or under saving. Moreover, higher cognitive ability might reduce uncertainty, but greater 
uncertainty about needs in retirement might increase precautionary saving, or it may lead to a lower 
valuation of the effect of current saving on utility gained by additional consumption in retirement 
and thereby reduce saving. 
Or basic numeracy might lead directly to the accumulation of additional wealth for 
retirement. Most obviously, more able individuals may gain higher returns on their retirement 
assets, allocating their assets to tax favored instruments, to investments with a higher payoff and 
lower fees, or they may make fewer mistakes adjusting their portfolios over time. More able 
individuals may also realize the need to save for retirement, while the issue may either escape the 
attention of those who have difficulties making financial calculations, or who may simply be 
overwhelmed by the task. Some with lower cognitive ability may be unable to understand the need 
for substantial retirement saving so they eventually will be able to support their current 
consumption in retirement, let alone to determine the amount of wealth required to meet their 
consumption needs in retirement. 
If numeracy reduces financial errors, this would create a direct link between numeracy and 
wealth that would not necessarily involve greater specific knowledge of pensions and Social   8
Security. One such linkage has been investigated by Zinman and Stango (2009). They find evidence 
relating misunderstanding of how compound interest works to financial wealth. Their argument is 
that the tendency to linearize the exponential growth of interest leads to greater borrowing and 
lower levels of wealth. In a similar vein, Gerardi, Goette and Meier (2010) find that lower numeracy 
is associated with greater chance of delinquency and default in the subprime housing market.  
 
III. Sample and Construction of Variables  
The sample used in our analysis is based on respondents to the Health and Retirement 
Study from couple households. The sample is restricted to the early boomer cohort, those from 
households with at least one member age 51 to 56 in 2004. We restrict the sample to the early 
boomer cohort because it is the first HRS cohort for which we have measures of numeracy at the 
time they entered the survey. We focus on those 51 to 56 because most measures of pension 
knowledge in the HRS are derived from questions asking about pensions on the respondent’s 
current job.
3 Typically, those jobs offering pensions to respondents over the age of fifty are the 
same jobs they held at prime working age. Thus we do not want to select an older population where 
those remaining on their long term job are not representative of workers who were ever covered by 
a pension.
  
A. Measures of Pension Variables 
Using HRS data, it is possible to construct a number of measures of pension and Social 
Security knowledge. A basic measure distinguishes between respondents who answer “don’t know” 
(dk) to questions about pension and Social Security characteristics or values and those who do 
answer the relevant questions. Another measure compares respondent answers with values 
                                                 
3 In the HRS, those who have already retired are not asked about their expected benefits. Those who are older 
than the early retirement age are not asked about their early retirement benefits. Those who are older than the normal 
retirement age are not asked about their normal retirement benefits.  
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calculated by evaluating employer plan descriptions using the relevant respondent's work histories. 
Questions about pensions include plan type, age of eligibility for early and normal retirement 
benefits, benefit amounts to be paid to holders of defined benefit plans at early or normal retirement 
ages, account balances in defined contribution plans, and related questions. Knowledge of Social 
Security benefits is measured by the frequency of don’t know responses to questions about benefits 
at early and normal retirement ages. When analyzing the frequency of don’t know responses, we use 
two different measures. One measure is a simple don’t know response to the question. The second 
indicator classifies the respondent as not knowing the answer only if the respondent responds “don’t 
know” to the initial question, and when presented with a series of bracketed values for the variable 
in question continues to respond “don’t know”. 
The subsamples of the early boomer population used for analysis varies with the measure of 
pension or Social Security knowledge being analyzed. For example, if we are investigating 
knowledge of the account balance in a defined contribution plan, the sample is limited to the subset 
of the population with a defined contribution pension. Similarly, if we are investigating knowledge 
of annual benefits to be paid at expected retirement age for those with a defined benefit plan, the 
sample is limited to those with a defined benefit plan. Empirical work reported in the appendices 
demonstrates that the main findings are not affected by the differences in population base created by 
the use of different measures of pension and Social Security knowledge.  
Descriptive data for some of the measures of knowledge of pensions and Social Security 
used in our analysis are reported in Appendix Table 2, Part B. Some measures will be more useful 
than others. For example, only 3 percent of those with a pension indicate they do not know their 
plan type. This will limit the usefulness of the dk plan type measure in our later analysis. On the 
other hand, when we use indicators of whether the respondent and firm agree, there is much more 
variation in the knowledge measures. For example, the measure of agreement as to plan type is   10
based on a broad measure of agreement. There we say the respondent and firm reported the same 
plan type either when there is exact agreement, or when one reported one plan type, say DB, while 
the other reported coverage by both plan types. When the broad measure of agreement is used, the 
level of agreement is very high, at 88 percent. The frequency of agreement is much lower when we 
use a narrower definition of plan type. For example, to say the respondent and firm both agree the 
plan type is DB only, as in row 6 of Appendix Table 2, Part B, or DC only, as in row 7, they both 
must respond the plan type is DB only or DC only. If either responds both, there is no match. The 
frequency of agreement is much lower when narrow agreement is required, with 10 percent of 
respondents agreeing the plan is DB only, and 16 percent agreeing the plan is DC only. 
The measure of whether respondents know the value of their Social Security benefits, either 
at the early or normal age of eligibility, exhibits considerable variability. In Part C of Appendix 
Table 2, 37 percent of respondents say they do not know what their Social Security benefits would 
be at the Social Security early age of benefit eligibility, and 32 percent say they don't know their 
benefits at the normal Social Security entitlement age.  
B. Measures of Cognition 
Our analysis uses three indicators of cognition from the Health and Retirement Study 
(HRS), TICS questions, word recall and numeracy. These are available in the core of the HRS for 
the early boomer cohort, and as noted in the previous section have been shown in earlier studies to 
be significantly correlated with wealth.  
Two “TICS” (Telephone Interview of Intact Cognitive Status) questions are used here. They 
rate a person’s ability to serially subtract 7 from 100, and to count backward (from 20 to 1)
4. 
                                                 
4 McArdle, Smith and Willis (2009) investigate the relation of cognition to wealth for all HRS respondents 
over the age of fifty. They include additional TICS measures beside the two included in our analysis. The additional 
measures help to discriminate levels of cognition among those over 65. One such measure evaluates a second try at 
backward counting for those who failed the first try. Others of the additional TICS questions ask about knowledge of 
the date of the interview, names of the President and Vice President, the name of the device for cutting paper, and the 
name for a prickly plant that grows in the desert. We do not include these additional measures in this paper because we   11
Backward counting equals 2 if the respondent could correctly count at the first try. Otherwise it 
equals zero. The Series 7 value is the sum of correct answers to any of the questions in the series. 
The range for TICS is from 0 to 7.  
Word recall refers to an individual’s recall of a list of words, using the average of the sum of 
correct answers to the immediate and delayed word recalls. It ranges between 0 and 10. 
The measure of numeracy is the sum of the number of correct answers to three questions, 
asking for calculations involving compound interest, fractions and probability. One question asks 
for the calculation of how many people out of 1000 would be sick if there were a ten percent chance 
of contracting a disease. Second, if there were five winners of a lottery offering a $2 million prize, 
what will each receive? Third, with $200 in a saving account earning 10 percent interest per year, 
what will be in the account at the end of two years? Numeracy ranges from 0 to 3.   
Descriptive statistics for the cognition variables for various subsamples of the Early Boomer 
cohort used in our analysis are reported in Appendix Table 1.  
C. Measures of Wealth 
  When relating knowledge to wealth, two measures of wealth are used alternatively as 
dependent variables. The first is total wealth excluding pensions and Social Security wealth. This 
measure includes stocks and other financial instruments, the value of the home, real estate, business 
wealth, ownership of autos, and other sources of wealth. The second measure is total wealth 
including the wealth equivalent of pensions and Social Security. Given the findings that we 
discussed from earlier studies, where pensions seemed to increase saving in other forms, when 
analyzing the relation between wealth and financial knowledge we include pension wealth on the 
right hand side of the relevant regressions. Our findings regarding the relation of cognition and/or 
                                                                                                                                                                  
focus on the population ages 51 to 56, where these measures are not very helpful in determining differences in 
cognition.    12
pension knowledge to wealth are not, however, sensitive to whether pension wealth is included as a 
covariate. 
 
IV. Relation of Knowledge of Pensions and Social Security to Numeracy  
Table 1 reports the results of a series of probit equations relating various measures of 
respondent knowledge of their pensions and Social Security to the level of current pension wealth 
(or DB or DC wealth where appropriate), and to measures of cognition, including the score from 
two elements of the TICS variables (backward counting and serial sevens), word recall and 
numeracy.
5 A number of covariates listed below the table are also included. The cells in the table 
are dprobits, reporting the effect of a one unit change in the independent variable on the probability 
of observing the knowledge measure. 
The table is divided into three sections according to whether the dependent variable pertains 
to plan type, retirement age, or to the value of the pension.  
We first consider evidence supporting a partial, but important, underlying economic 
explanation for knowledge of pensions. Knowledge of pensions is greater if the plan is more 
valuable. Pension wealth measures are significant at conventional levels in explaining the following 
measures of pension knowledge. Those with higher pension wealth are more likely to agree with 
their employer as to plan type, are less likely to say they do not know the early retirement age for 
their defined contribution plan, are more likely to agree with their firm about the age they will be 
eligible for early retirement benefits, are less likely to say they do not know the value of their 
                                                 
5 Gustman and Steinmeier (2005a) related these knowledge measures to the HRS indicator of word recall, but 
found no significant results. Other studies that include measures of cognitive ability, using very simple measures of 
knowledge of pensions, find that numeracy is related to pension knowledge (e.g., see Banks and Oldfield, 2007). Their 
measure of pension knowledge is an indicator of whether or not the respondent says they know the benefit accrual rate, 
or the level of pension benefits. That is, they focus on dk responses. The relation of numeracy to these outcomes 
remains significant even when there are controls for other dimensions of cognitive ability and education.  
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defined benefit pensions at normal retirement age, and are more likely to agree with their firm on 
the amount of benefits their DB plan is expected to pay.  
We do not believe there is strong reverse causality, with greater knowledge of pensions 
leading to higher pension wealth. To be sure, greater knowledge may lead to higher contribution 
rates to DC plans, and more effective investment strategies. But it is harder to make the case that a 
relationship between knowledge of defined benefit plans and pension wealth is due to reverse 
causality. Yet for the population approaching retirement age examined in this paper, DB plans 
represent two thirds of pension wealth. The value of a defined benefit plan depends only on the 
earnings and experience of the covered worker, not on any additional activity that may be 
disproportionately undertaken by better informed individuals. Nor do we believe that selection into 
pension jobs is an important issue. Jobs with pensions carry much higher wages, which are likely to 
have driven the choice of employment when the worker was younger.
6 
The results describing how respondents' knowledge of their pensions or Social Security 
varies with the respondent's level of cognition are not nearly so straight forward to understand. 
Indeed, taken together, these findings contribute to a major puzzle.  
Consider the coefficient on numeracy in row 1, column 4 of Table 1. A one unit increase in 
numeracy, which means the individual answered an additional one of the three numeracy questions, 
increases the probability of a respondent reporting he or she does not know the plan type by 2.6 
percent. Of course, here the sign is in the "wrong" direction.  
To be sure, taken by itself this result is not so surprising. Ninety seven percent of 
respondents claim they know their plan type. So there is little variation in the dependent variable to 
                                                 
6 At the time they joined their firms, those approaching retirement age in 2004 faced plan provisions that were quite 
different from those found in later years. Moreover, pension jobs, especially those offering defined benefit plans, were 
typically in unionized firms and large firms that paid premium wages, making the jobs attractive irrespective of the 
pension offer. For further discussion, see Gustman, Steinmeier and Tabatabai (2010), chapter 2.   14
be explained, and the perverse sign can be treated as an anomaly. It makes no sense that increased 
numeracy would increase the number saying they don’t know their plan type.  
Yet a similar relation is found between numeracy and other measures of knowledge of plan 
type. For example, as seen in row 2, column 4, the probability that the respondent and firm agree on 
the type of pension plan is lower by 3.9 percent for those who have greater numeracy. That is, 
greater numeracy leads to a reduction in agreement between respondent and firm reports of plan 
type. 
Nor do the measures of cognition help in explaining other measures of plan type, whether 
don’t know responses, or indicators that the respondent’s answer is the same as that from the 
matched employer plan description. Although some coefficients are significant, there are no 
systematic relations between measures of cognition and plan type that are consistent and plausible. 
Nor do the coefficients change when pension wealth is no longer included as a covariate. Thus it is 
not that one set of results or another is ignoring some indirect path from cognition to knowledge of 
plan type. 
One might argue that knowledge of plan type is not an appropriate indicator of knowledge of 
one’s pension. That is why we have tried such a wide range of other indicators of pension 
knowledge. Yet we find no plausibly consistent effect of any of the indicators of cognition on 
knowledge of pensions and Social Security.  
Thus Section B of Table 1 presents analogous results on the relation of cognition to 
knowledge of retirement age. Once again, there are no consistent and plausible relations between 
measures of cognition and an indicator of knowledge of a respondent’s pension. 
Section C of Table 1 takes us to indicators of the relation of numeracy to knowledge of 
benefit values. When covariates are included, there is no effect of numeracy on knowledge of plan 
values. Especially telling here, numeracy is not related to knowledge of DC plan values.    15
We also include in the last two rows of the table indicators of the respondents' knowledge of 
their Social Security benefits. Counter intuitively, the result in the last row of column 4, which 
approaches significance, suggests that greater numeracy increases the likelihood of saying one 
doesn't know Social Security benefits at normal retirement age.  
So to this point, it would appear that, although earlier studies have shown that cognition, and 
numeracy in particular, significantly affect wealth held outside of defined benefit pensions and 
Social Security, they have no effect on knowledge of pensions. This result may create some doubt 
about the efficacy of the many cognition variables we have examined. Given an expectation that 
these measures of cognition improve wealth by increasing basic knowledge of financial instruments, 
one would expect each of these measures, TICS (serial 7 and backward counting), word recall and 
numeracy, to bear a systematic and consistent relation to measures of knowledge of pensions and 
Social Security. But they do not. 
So we are left wondering why the measures of knowledge of pensions are influenced so 
strongly by pension values, but are virtually unaffected by measures of cognition. This mystery will 
deepen as we examine the joint relation between knowledge of pensions and Social Security, 
cognition, and the value of wealth.  
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Other covariates include indicators of respondent’s union and public employment status, measures of TICS, 
Recall and Numeracy for the respondent's spouse, a series of dummy variables for respondent’s education, 
dummy variables indicating whether the respondent is female, nonwhite, Hispanic, age and age squared for 
respondent and spouse, spouse’s school years, whether respondent is financially knowledgeable R, dummy 
variables indicating Social Security Wealth on an if claim now basis (<50,000; 50,000 to100,000 omitted; 
100,000 to 150,000; 150,000 to 200,000; >200,000) [these measures are due to Kandice Kapinos of the 
Health and Retirement Study], dummy variables for missing values including those who were proxies, 
whether the respondent answered dk to questions about cognition variables, and a dummy if pension wealth 
is imputed. Current pension, DB, and DC wealth are in millions of dollars. DB wealth includes a calculation 
of the present value of the respondent’s expected DB benefits for his/her most important DB plan. DC wealth 
includes the sum of all DC accounts from R’s current job. 
*Nine cases who reported they have a DB plan from their current job, but that they were receiving benefits 
currently, are excluded.  
z-statistics are reported in parentheses. 
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V. Relation of Household Wealth to Each Spouse’s Knowledge of Their Pension and Social 
Security, to Cognitive Ability, and to Other Key Covariates.  
  So far we have not been able to find a relation of cognition to knowledge of pensions and 
Social Security. We have, however, found a relation between knowledge of pensions and Social 
Security and the level of pension wealth. There also are the findings of a strong relationship 
between cognition and wealth from McArdle, Smith and Willis (2009). We put these findings 
together by estimating the relation of total wealth to pension and Social Security knowledge, 
including pension wealth as a covariate. Next, using a sample comparable to the one we use to 
analyze pension knowledge, we reestimate the results from McArdle, Smith and Willis (2009), 
linking wealth to cognition. Third, we include all three elements in the same regression. This will 
allow us to answer three questions: Does knowledge of pensions and Social Security bear any 
systematic relation to non-pension, non-Social Security wealth? What is the role of pension wealth 
in influencing the relation of pension knowledge to other forms of wealth? Does knowledge of 
pensions and Social Security affect the measured relation between cognition and wealth?  
  To begin, estimates in Table 2 relate the wealth of a respondent's household to that person's 
knowledge of their pensions and Social Security. Observations are respondent based, with one 
observation for each individual member of couple households with at least one of them aged 51 to 
56 in 2004 and having a pension. Three different measures of wealth alternate as dependent 
variables. Results for total household wealth (in thousands of dollars) are reported in columns 1 and 
2. Findings for the ratio of household wealth to household income are reported in columns 3 and 4. 
Regressions with total household wealth excluding pensions and Social Security as the dependent 
variable are reported in columns 5 and 6. Measures of knowledge of the respondent's pension and 
Social Security are the same as those discussed earlier.    19
  The results in Table 2 provide little support for a view that greater knowledge of pensions is 
a sign of the kind of greater financial sophistication that would increase retirement wealth. Columns 
1, 3 and 5 of the table report the coefficients of the measure of pension or Social Security 
knowledge in the regressions for wealth. Only four out of thirty of these measures of knowledge 
exhibit coefficients that are significant at or near conventional levels. The coefficient in row 1, 
column 1, suggests that if a person reports not knowing what type of plan their pension is, that 
person will have $127,300 less wealth than persons who say they know their plan type. In row 3, 
column 1, when a respondent and firm agree the plan is defined benefit, the total wealth is $93,510 
higher.  
  However, among the four statistically significant results, there are also two counter intuitive 
findings. Specifically, in column 5, rows 4 and 5, if a person indicates not knowing the early or 
normal retirement ages for a DB plan, household wealth outside of the pension is higher by $67,620 
and $48,570 respectively.  
  Columns 2, 4 and 6 report the coefficients estimated for the measures of pension wealth, 
where this variable is entered into the right hand side of the alternative wealth regressions. Looking 
down columns 2 and 4, allowing for considerable variation in the coefficient estimates, and the fact 
that some coefficients differ significantly from 1.0, each dollar of pension wealth is associated with 
roughly another dollar in total wealth. This suggests little substitution of pension wealth for other 
forms of wealth. Respondents do not save less outside of their pension because they have access to 
more pension wealth. The last column relates total wealth excluding pensions and Social Security to 
pension wealth. Here the coefficients are significantly greater than zero, and suggest that those with 
pensions save slightly more in other forms for each dollar of additional pension wealth. Again, there 
is no suggestion of substantial substitution between pensions and other forms of wealth.    20
  To reconcile the coefficients in columns 2 and 6, note that column 6 tells us how a $1 
increase in pension wealth is related to wealth outside of both the pension and Social Security. 
Column 2 indicates how a $1 increase in pension wealth is related to the sum of pension wealth, 
Social Security wealth, and wealth held outside of pensions and Social Security. Thus taking the 
result in row 4, it is perfectly consistent to find on the one hand that an additional dollar of pension 
wealth raises wealth outside of pensions and Social Security by 11.6 cents, while increasing total 
wealth by 83.9 cents. The difference reflects the correlation between pensions and Social Security. 
One final note. Although it might seem that a very limited effect of pension knowledge on total 
wealth is the result of holding pension wealth constant, the findings are similar when pension 
wealth is not included in the equations reported in Table 2.   21
Table 2: Marginal Effects of Pension and Social Security Knowledge on Household Wealth: Ages 51-56 in 
2004. (Note: Measures of cognition are not included in these regressions.) 
  Dependent Variable: HH 
Total Wealth  
(thousands of dollars) 
Dependent Variable: Ratio 
of HH Total Wealth to HH 
Income 
Dependent Variable: HH 
Total Wealth Excluding 
Pension & SS Wealth 
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Estimated with robust regression. Covariates not listed in the table include an indicator if respondent is female, race, age 
and age squared for respondent and spouse, a series of dummy variables for respondent’s education, spouse’s school 
years, whether respondent is financially knowledgeable R, if a union member or public employee, dummy variables 
indicating Social Security Wealth on an if claim now basis (<50,000; 50,000 to100,000 omitted; 100,000 to 150,000; 
150,000 to 200,000; >200,000), dummy variables for missing values; , and a dummy if pension wealth is imputed.   22
   Before presenting wealth equations that include measures of pension knowledge together 
with measures of cognition, Table 3 provides a second baseline for the wealth regressions by 
including only cognition measures and other covariates, but not measures of pension knowledge as 
explanatory variables. The table presents estimates of marginal effects of the three key measures of 
cognition on wealth, TICS, word recall and numeracy. In alternative specifications, wealth is 
measured by non-pension, non-Social Security wealth and total wealth. The format of the equations 
is the same as in McArdle, Smith and Willis (2009), except that pension wealth is also included as a 
covariate. The population underlying the regressions in Table 3 is different from the one used in 
their analysis, which includes the entire HRS population for 2006. As noted previously, to enable us 
eventually to include measures of knowledge of pensions and Social Security, which are available 
for 2004, our sample for all tables is confined to couple households with at least one member 51 to 
56 in 2004. In addition, so the estimates of the equations used to analyze the relation of cognition to 
wealth will be comparable to the samples used to analyze the effects of knowledge of pension plan 
type, retirement age and plan values, the results in Table 3 are confined in one set of regressions to 
those who report they are covered by a pension, and in another to those HRS respondents for whom 
there is a matched employer provided pension plan description.  
  Otherwise, these wealth equations are specified as in McArdle, Smith and Willis (2009). 
Specifically, cognition measures are reported separately for the financially knowledgeable 
respondent and the spouse. Note, however, that the financially knowledgeable respondent may not 
be the member of the household who has a pension. What the wealth regressions show is how the 
cognition of each spouse is related to the household’s wealth, not how the cognition of the spouse 
with a pension is related to household wealth.    23
  None of our major findings are affected by differences between the populations used in the 
two studies. As in McArdle, Smith and Willis (2009), numeracy of the financially knowledgeable 
respondent is the dominant determinant of wealth among the six cognition measures shown.
7  
  From row 3, columns 1 and 2 of Table 3, a one unit increase in the numeracy score for a 
financially knowledgeable respondent is associated with an additional $26,000 in wealth 
accumulated outside of the pension and Social Security. From columns 3 and 4, among the 
population with a pension, higher numeracy for the financial R also increases the total wealth of the 
household. But it does not have a significant effect on total wealth within the population of those 
who have a matched employer pension.  
                                                 
7 Although not reported here, we built a bridge between the wealth equations in McArdle Smith and Willis (2009) and 
those in this paper. Given the number of differences in the underlying samples, this bridge involves changing the 
specification of the wealth equation one difference at a time. We are grateful to Jim Smith, who provided the 
information required to duplicate the initial results from McArdle, Smith and Willis (2009). 
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Table 3: Marginal Effects of Measures of Cognition and Current Pension on Household Wealth: 
Ages 51-56 in 2004 (Wealth is measured in thousands of dollars.) 
 
  Wealth Excluding Pensions and Social 
Security 
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Rs with Pension 
 
 
Rs with matched 
pension 
 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4) 




































































Covered Worker         








Estimated with robust regression. Covariates not listed in the table include indices for female, financial R, Hispanic, 
non-white, household total income and its square, respondent’s and his/her spouse’s age and their squares, respondent’s 
and his/her spouse’s education.  
t-statistics are reported in parentheses.   25
  The next step is to enter measures of cognition and pension and Social Security knowledge 
in the same regressions for wealth. Table 4 relates wealth excluding pensions and Social Security to 
these measures. Table 5 relates total wealth, including pensions and Social Security, to cognition 
and measures of pension knowledge. Given the effect of pension value on pension knowledge, and 
the relation of pension value to nonpension, non-Social Security wealth, the level of pension wealth 
is included as a covariate in each equation. Other covariates are listed below the table. 
  The results are divided into three sections: coefficients for the cognition measures for the 
financially knowledgeable respondent; coefficients for the cognition measures for the spouse who is 
not the financially knowledgeable respondent; and under the title "Covered Worker", measures of 
pension knowledge exhibited by the worker who is covered by a pension. Once again, there are 
three different sets of measures of pension knowledge – those pertaining to plan type, those 
pertaining to retirement age, and those pertaining to plan value. 
  There are three clear conclusions from the results in both tables. First, as seen in rows 3 and 
6 of each table, numeracy of the financially knowledgeable respondent, followed by numeracy of 
the nonfinancial respondent, are the major cognitive determinants of wealth. Second, from Table 4, 
row 7, pension wealth is associated with a higher level of non-pension, non-Social Security wealth. 
Third, in a few cases, greater pension knowledge is associated with higher wealth, with some 
variables bordering on significance. But for the most part, pension knowledge is not a major 
determinant of either wealth held outside of the pension plan, or of total wealth.  
  Given the weak relation between measures of knowledge of pensions to measures of 
cognition, it is not surprising that the coefficients on knowledge variables are not affected when 
measures of cognition are added to wealth regressions, and coefficients on measures of cognition 
are not affected when measures of pension and Social Security knowledge are added to wealth 
regressions. It is not just that the insignificant variables measuring the effects of pension knowledge   26
on wealth, in say, Table 2, column 5, remain insignificant when measures of cognition are added to 
the regression. It is that the coefficients on the cognition variables remain unchanged when 
measures of pension knowledge are added to the regression. This can be seen by comparing Table 
3, column 2 with Table 4, column 1.  
  Notice that within Tables 4 and 5, the coefficients on numeracy and on pension wealth 
bounce around among regressions. Further examination suggests it is not the differences in 
covariates among regressions that is responsible. Rather, it is differences in samples that are 
responsible. The samples are restricted by the definition of the pension knowledge variable. Column 
1 includes those with a pension and matched employer pension plan description. The sample in 
columns 2 and 3 include those with a pension who report having a defined benefit plan. In column 
4, respondents have a matched employer plan description and a defined benefit plan. Column 5 
includes those with a defined contribution plan. The sample for column 6 requires that the 
respondent report expecting Social Security benefits.   
To summarize, although the specifications relating pension knowledge to wealth outside of 
pensions and Social Security do not suggest a relation between measures of pension knowledge and 
other forms of wealth, they all suggest that numeracy bears a significant relation to wealth outside 
of pensions and Social Security. As a consequence, including measures of pension knowledge has 
little or no effect on the estimated relation between measures of numeracy and wealth. 
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Table 4: Marginal Effects of Measures of Financial Knowledge and Cognition on Household 
Wealth Excluding Pensions and Social Security: Ages 51-56 in 2004 (Wealth is measured in 
thousands of dollars.)  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 

































































































DK-Plan Type  -20.88 
(0.40) 
- - - - - 
R and Firm Agree on All 




- - - -  - 




- - - -  - 
DK-ER Age for DB  -  36.80 
(1.52) 
- - - - 
DK- expected DB benefit  -  - 62.66 
(1.46) 
- - - 
R & firm agree on 
expected DB benefits 
-  - -  -28.80 
(0.95)
- - 
DK-DC Balances  -  -  - -  -64.44 
(1.79) 
-
DK-ER Age for DC Plan  - - - - -21.42 
(1.14) 
-
DK- SS Ben at ER age  -  -  -  -  -  7.64 
(0.50) 
DK- SS Ben at NR age  -  -  -  -  -  -3.39 
(0.21) 
Estimated with robust regression. The dependent variable is household wealth excluding Social Security and pension 
benefits. Covariates not listed in the table include indices for female, financial R, Hispanic, non-white, household total 
income and its square, respondent’s and his/her spouse’s age and their squares, and respondent’s and his/her spouse’s 
education.  
t-statistics are reported in parentheses.   28
Table 5: Marginal Effects of Measures of Financial Knowledge and Cognition on Total Household 
Wealth: Ages 51-56 in 2004 (Wealth is measured in thousands of dollars.)  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 

































































































DK-Plan Type  -59.33 
(0.64) 
- - - - - 
R and Firm Agree on All 




- - - - - 




- - - - - 
DK-ER Age for DB  -  19.34 
(0.42) 
- - - - 
DK- Expected DB 
Benefit 
-  - 58.43 
(0.72) 
- - - 
R & Firm Agree on 
Expected DB Benefits 
-  - -  5.90 
(0.11)
- - 
DK-DC Balances  -  -  - -  -67.13 
(1.15) 
- 
DK-ER Age for DC Plan  - - -  -  -80.39 
(2.66) 
- 
DK- SS Ben at ER age  -  -  -  -  -  16.73 
(0.67) 
DK- SS Ben at NR age  -  -  -  -  -  -7.40 
(0.28) 
Estimated with robust regression. The dependent variable is household wealth including Social Security and pension 
benefits. Covariates not listed in the table include indices for female, financial R, Hispanic, non-white, household total 
income and its square, respondent’s and his/her spouse’s age and their squares, and respondent’s and his/her spouse’s 
education.  
t-statistics are reported in parentheses.  29
  VI. Conclusions and Policy Implications 
Our initial hope in undertaking this paper was to shed further light on the role of 
cognition, and in particular of numeracy, in shaping wealth accumulated for retirement. 
We thought that a part of the link between cognition and wealth reflected the fact that 
higher cognition leads to increased knowledge of retirement finances, which in turn leads 
to higher wealth. This idea was strengthened not only by findings in the literature on the 
relation of cognition, and especially numeracy to wealth, but also by earlier findings 
linking pension knowledge to pension wealth, and a failure to find a reduction in non-
pension saving to correspond with higher pension wealth.  
We have not succeeded in establishing these linkages. Although we confirm the 
finding in the literature that higher cognition, and in particular greater numeracy, is 
associated with the accumulation of additional retirement wealth, we also find the initial 
evidence that more numerate individuals better understand their pensions or Social 
Security to be very fragile. Nor do we find evidence linking cognition or numeracy to 
wealth accumulation in association with increased knowledge of pensions and Social 
Security. Moreover, we do not find that the substitution of pensions for other forms of 
wealth varies with knowledge of pensions.  
Instead we find that many of the questions as to the avenues through which 
cognition and numeracy increase retirement wealth remain unanswered. As a result, we 
remain unsure of how best to use the apparently robust numeracy-wealth relation in 
designing policies that are aimed at increasing retirement saving.    
To be sure, many people do not have an incentive to understand their pensions 
and Social Security, even when reaching their early or mid-fifties. For some their plans   30
are not sufficiently valuable to pay much attention. For others, their retirement is assured 
due to a generous pension that does not require monitoring. Perhaps most importantly, for 
those currently approaching retirement age, the largest share of their pension wealth 
remains in defined benefit plans where typically there is little for an individual to do in 
order to increase retirement benefits.  
But shouldn’t greater numeracy that leads to greater wealth accumulation also 
have created greater financial acumen, which is then reflected indirectly as increased 
knowledge of pensions? When the finding that those with pensions are motivated to 
accumulate higher balances outside of their pensions and Social Security was uncovered 
in the literature, it was argued that those with pensions learn from their providers about 
the need for retirement saving and perhaps increased their understanding of how wealth 
accumulation works. Yet knowledge of pensions and Social Security does not affect 
saving behavior. 
Why does numeracy play an important role in influencing saving, even holding 
income constant, while knowledge of pensions plays none?  
When combined with findings from our earlier studies, many puzzles remain. In 
previous work (Gustman and Steinmeier, 2001) we found that those who overestimate the 
values of their pensions and Social Security in the years before retirement nevertheless do 
not eventually change their saving or retirement behavior by saving more over the next 
eight years, or retiring later. Nor do those who understate their plan values change their 
behavior. Accordingly, they must eventually adjust their consumption. 
It is not that people are totally clueless about the incentives created by their 
retirement plans. An extensive retirement literature is characterized by a strong response   31
of retirement to incentives from pensions and Social Security (e.g., Gustman and 
Steinmeier, 2005b).  Moreover, changes in Social Security rules designed to encourage 
delayed retirement have clearly had predicted effects on retirement (Gustman and 
Steinmeier, 2009). One would certainly expect that it is easier for those with higher 
cognition to understand these complex rules. But we have been unable to find a direct 
link empirically from cognition through measures of knowledge of pensions and Social 
Security to accumulated wealth.  
We have tried a variety of specifications to ensure that the absence of a link 
between knowledge of pensions and Social Security and numeracy, and the knowledge 
variables and wealth, is not due to a particular specification we have adopted. We have 
tried specifications with and without pension wealth included as a covariate. If there is no 
link, we are left with a list of questions. Accepting the relation between numeracy and 
wealth, what exactly is the mechanism by which numeracy affects wealth? What 
calculations or behavior does numeracy affect that are not ultimately reflected in pension 
or Social Security knowledge?  
Policy Implications: 
Our findings raise questions about the avenues through which cognition and 
numeracy increase retirement wealth. Accordingly, our analysis raises questions about 
whether the apparently robust numeracy-wealth relation provides a basis for designing 
policies that are aimed at increasing retirement saving by increasing numeracy or 
financial literacy. 
Financial education would seem to be a basic policy that would allow those with 
lower levels of numeracy to nevertheless save adequately for their retirement. The   32
numeracy-wealth relation, which remains even after standardizing for the differences in 
earnings that result from higher numeracy, seems to suggest that those with higher 
numeracy have an easier time accumulating knowledge of financial instruments, 
understanding risk, and appreciating the need for, and the best ways to accumulate, 
retirement saving. But our findings suggest the numeracy-wealth relation may reflect 
something else. Perhaps numeracy reflects an unmeasured characteristic of the individual 
that cannot be learned but does generate higher wealth. If nothing else, these findings 
suggest a good deal of caution is warranted before assuming that classes in financial 
basics, tutorials or other efforts to convey financial knowledge will induce appropriate 
saving habits, choices in the face of risk, or a proper approach to spending down assets 
after retiring. Although these policy initiatives may well ultimately encourage additional 
saving, they should be carefully and rigorously evaluated on an individual basis before 
financial education and training programs are adopted on a significant scale. 
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Appendix 1. Measures of Cognition, Demographic Characteristics, Income and Wealth 
in Different HRS Subsamples  
Appendix Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for indicators of cognition, 
demographic characteristics, income, wealth and other variables used in our analyses. 
Column 1 shows the means and standard deviations for the full sample of couple 
households with at least one member aged 51 to 56 in 2004. The columns that follow 
restrict the sample to those with a pension, those with a matched employer pension plan 
description, those with a defined benefit plan, those with a defined contribution plan, and 
those expecting Social Security benefits at the early or normal retirement age. 
  As can be seen by selecting a row and comparing means across the columns of 
Appendix Table 1, there is not much variation in the independent variables as the sample 
is restricted to those with a pension, those with a pension who also have a matched 
employer plan, those with a DB plan, and those with a DC plan. To be sure, as seen in the 
first six rows of the table, cognition measures are slightly higher for those with pensions 
than for the general population of couple households. However, restricting the 
populations to those with a matched employer plan, those claiming a DB pension, or 
those with a DC pension, does not have a systematic effect on the cognition variables. 
The means of some demographic measures do differ across populations. For 
example, because Hispanics have lower pension coverage than whites or blacks, they are 
a smaller share of the pension covered population than of the overall population. Income 
also varies with sample composition. Those with a pension have higher incomes than 
those without a pension, and those with a defined benefit (DB) pension have higher 
incomes than those whose pension is not DB. Also importantly, total wealth is higher   35
among households with a pension, and total wealth is lower among those households with 
a DB pension. On the whole, the various sample restrictions have relatively modest 
effects on the means of listed variables.   36
Appendix Table 1: Selected Measures of Cognition, Demographic Status, Income and Wealth, for Members of Two Person 
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(5.23) (5.0)  (4.78)  (5.10) (5.05)  (5.34)  (5.32) 
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N  3418 1520  639  743  1078 2398 2415 
* Standard deviations are in parenthesis 
* * In 1000 dollars 
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Appendix Table 2 has three sections. Part A describes the underlying populations 
according to employment, pension and Social Security coverage, availability of matched 
pension plan descriptions from employers or Social Security records, and reported 
outcomes. Part B reports means of measures of knowledge of pensions. Part C does the 
same for measures of knowledge of Social Security. Given interest in the roles played in 
households by the spouse who is financially knowledgeable (as identified by the 
household), and important remaining differences between outcomes for men and women, 
the table separates the results both according to whether the household labels the 
respondent as the financially knowledgeable respondent (labeled as Financial R), or the 
other member of the household (Non-Financial R). The table also reports each of these 
outcomes by the sex of the respondent. Note also that in Appendix Table 2, the sample 
sizes differ as we move down the rows. These differences in sample composition should 
be borne in mind.  
As can be seen in Appendix Table 2, Section A, row 3, seventy eight percent of 
men from couple households and 69 percent of women held a job in 2004. From row 5, 
60 percent of employed men and 61 percent of employed women from couple households 
reported coverage by a pension. From row 7, thirty five percent of men reporting a 
pension, and fifty percent of women, had a matched employer pension plan in 2004. 
About half of respondents with a pension on their current job report they have a defined 
benefit plan. Around 73 percent of men and 68 percent of women reported having a 
defined contribution (DC) plan. Because many individuals have both a defined benefit 
and a defined contribution pension, the total of the share of those with pensions holding a   39
defined benefit plan, and the share of those with pensions holding a defined contribution 
plan, exceeds 1.0. Moving toward the bottom of Section A of the table, in couple 
households, 60 percent of men and 61 percent of women have a matched Social Security 
record.   40
Appendix Table 2: Descriptive Data Regarding Pension Coverage and Pension Knowledge, Couple Households, Health and Retirement Study, Early Boomer 








  All  Males Females  All  Males Females  All  Males Females 
Part A: Indicators of Employment, Coverage, Plan Type, Matched Employer and Social Security Data 
Total    3418  1708  1710  1709  1041 668 1709 667 1042 
Number  Employed  2510 1325 1185 1297  824  473  1213  501  712 
%  Employed  73 78 69 76 79 71 71 75 68 
Number Reporting Current 
Pension 
1520  801 719 818 524 294 702 277 425 
Percent Reporting Current 
Pension 
61 60 61 63 64 62 58 55 60 
Number Reporting Matched 
Employer Pension 
639 280 359 340 197 143 299  83  216 
Percent Reporting Matched 
Employer Pension 
42 35 50 42 38 49 43 30 51 
Percent (of R with current 
pension) Reporting DB/comb  
49 50 48 52 52 51 46 45 46 
Percent (of R with current 
pension)  Reporting DC/comb 
71 73 68 73 75 70 68 70 67 
Number with Matched Social 
Security Data 
2068 1029 1039 1068  664  404  1000  365  635 
Percent with Matched Social 
Security Data 
61 60 61 62 64 60 59 55 61 
Number Expecting Social 
Security benefit 
2647 1292 1355 1313  780  533  1334  512  822 
Percent Expecting Social 
Security benefit 
77 76 79 77 75 80 78 77 79 
Part B: Indicators of Pension Knowledge 
Percent (of R with current 
pension) Reporting DK Plan 
Type 
3 2 3 2 2 2 4 3 4 
Number  Firm  and  Respondent  565 248 318 298 172 126 267  76  191   41
Report of Plan Type Agree 
((broader restriction) 
Percent (of R with matched 
pension) Firm and 
Respondent Report of Plan 
Type Agree (broader 
restriction) 
90 89 89 88 87 88 89 92 88 
Number Firm and Respondent 
Report of Plan Type Agree 
(narrower restriction) 
170 68 102 79  47  32  91  21  70 
Percent (with matched 
pension) Firm and 
Respondent Report of Plan 
Type Agree (narrower 
restriction) 
27 24 28 23 24 22 30 25 32 
Percent (with matched 
pension) Reporting DB only 
with Matched DB only 
10 11 10  9  11  8  11 11 11 
Percent (with matched 
pension) Reporting DC only 
with Matched DC only 
16 16 16 15 15 15 17 18 17 
Percent with DB/comb 
Reporting DK on Early 
Retirement Age 
9  7 12 7  7  7 12 9 15 
Percent with Matched 
DB/comb Agreeing on Early 
Retirement Age (On 
Diagonal) 
41 45 37 40 46 32 41 43 41 
Percent with DB/comb 
Reporting  DK on Normal 
Retirement Age  
7 5  10  5 4 7 9 5  11 
Percent with Matched 
DB/Comb Agreeing on 
Normal Retirement Age (On 
Diagonal) 
34 37 32 36 41 28 33 28 35 
Percent  (of  R  with  DB/comb)  5 4 7 3 3 4 8 6 9   42
with DB Reporting DK on 
Expected Retirement Age 
Percent (of R with DB/comb) 
Reporting  DK on Normal 
Retirement Benefits* 
42 34 52 38 30 52 48 42 51 
Percent with DB/Comb 
Reporting DK on Expected 
Retirement Benefits** 
40 31 51 37 28 52 45 37 50 
Percent with Matched DB 
Agreeing on Benefits at 
Expected Retirement Age (On 
Diagonal) 
18 20 16 21 23 19 13 13 13 
Percent (of R with DC/comb) 
Reporting DK on Early 
Retirement Age 
13 10 18 10  7  16 18 15 20 
Percent (of R with DC/comb)  
Answering DK on Account 
Balance 
34 30 39 31 28 35 38 32 41 
Percent (of R with DC/comb) 
Answering  DK after Brackets 
on Account Balance 
11 10 12 11 11 12 11  9  12 
Part C: Indicators of Social Security Knowledge 
Percent (R expecting SS 
benefits) Reporting DK on 
Early Retirement Benefit 
37 28 45 32 26 42 42 32 48 
Percent (R expecting SS 
benefits) Reporting DK on 
Normal Retirement Benefit 
32 23 40 28 21 38 36 26 42 
*Includes only those who provided a normal retirement age 
**Includes under dk those who could not provide an expected retirement age. 
***Rs expecting benefits based on own work and/or spouse’s work are included.  
Source: Gustman, Steinmeier and Tabatabai (2010) 
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Next we turn to the many measures of knowledge of pensions in Part B of 
Appendix Table 2. Together these measures confirm our findings from earlier work – the 
glass is half full, half empty. If we look at the fraction of the relevant populations who 
can call their plan type, ages of retirement or plan value, on average they do not do too 
badly. But if we look at measures of agreement between individual reports and relevant 
values obtained from employer plan descriptions, typically less than half fall on a 
diagonal indicating the respondent report and value obtained from the employer plan 
description agree. More specifically, plan values are reported in the following ranges, all 
in thousands of dollars: 20-40; 40-60; 60 to 80; 80-110; 110-150; 150 to 190; 190-240; 
240-300; >300. Plan values from respondents and firms are said to agree if both reports 
fall within the same range. 
We begin with indicators of knowledge of plan type. A simple “don’t know” 
report is not a helpful place to start. As seen in Part B, row 1, only 3 percent of 
respondents report they do not know their plan type. As a result, it is unlikely that this 
measure is a very interesting dependent variable. Nor is it very helpful in explaining 
variation in wealth.  
Other measures of pension knowledge are more interesting, however. If the 
measure of correctly identifying plan type is whether, when the firm reports a defined 
benefit plan, so does the respondent, as seen in row 3 of part B, agreement is obtained in 
roughly 90 percent of the cases. That is, according to this broad definition of a match, if 
either the worker or firm reports "both" (DB and DC) plan types, while the other reports 
only one plan type, we consider this to be a match. However, using a narrower definition 
of plan type, where a match requires that both the respondent and firm record indicate the   44
plan is DB only, DC only, or both only, 24 percent of men and 28 percent of women in 
couple households agree with their employer report of plan type. Regarding the specifics, 
if the respondent reports a pension that is defined benefit or combo, the matched plan 
description is defined benefit or combo in 58 percent of the cases. The comparable match 
rate is 49 percent when the respondent reports the plan is DC or combo. In the case of 
reported plan type, there is little difference between financially knowledgeable 
respondents or those who are not labeled as financially knowledgeable respondents. 
However, note that each person is talking about their own pension, not their spouse’s 
pension.  
Age of eligibility for benefits is another key characteristic of pensions. Of those 
reporting a defined benefit or combination pension, 7 percent of males from couple 
households, and 12 percent of females from couple households, report they do not know 
at what age they will become eligible for early retirement benefits. Yet for those 
reporting a defined benefit pension whose employer agrees the plan is DB, there is 
agreement between early retirement age reported by respondents and early retirement 
calculated from matched firm plan descriptions for 45 percent of males from couple 
households, and 37 percent of females. Turning to normal retirement ages, among those 
reporting coverage by a defined benefit pension, 5 percent of males from couple 
households and 10 percent of females report they do not know their normal retirement 
age. There is agreement on normal retirement age for those with a DB plan between the 
respondent report and the value computed from plan description for 37 percent of males 
from couple households and 32 percent of women. Among financially knowledgeable 
respondents, women (28 percent agreement with plan descriptions) know less than men   45
(41 percent agreement) about the normal retirement age of their defined benefit pension. 
Among those who are not the financially knowledgeable respondent, women (35 percent 
agreement with plan description) know more than men (28 percent) about the normal 
retirement age from their defined benefit plans. 
Skipping to the third row from last in Part B of Appendix Table 2, when those 
with defined contribution plans are asked about the age at which they will become 
eligible for early retirement benefits, ten percent of men and eighteen percent of women 
report they do not know.  
Respondents exhibit similar limitations in their knowledge of benefit amounts as 
they did in their knowledge of age of retirement. Of those reporting they were covered by 
a defined benefit pension, 34 percent of men and 52 percent of women from couple 
households report they do not know the value of the benefits they will receive from their 
plan at normal retirement age. In a small minority of cases, the benefit at expected 
retirement age matches the benefit obtained from employer plan descriptions. The match 
rates are 20 percent for males from couple households, and 16 percent for females from 
couple households.  
For males and females from couple households and females reporting coverage by 
a defined contribution pension, 30 percent of men and 39 percent of women answer they 
do not know what the balance is in their defined contribution pension. However, most of 
these are willing to report their account balance in the form of a bracket, which does not 
require them to report an exact amount. Among those reporting a DC plan, 10 percent of 
males from couple households, and 12 percent of females from couple households report   46
they do not know their plan balances even after presented with ranges of account 
balances as an alternative to having to report exact amounts. 
Having received a report from the Social Security Administration increases the 
information available to the respondent. Today, benefit reports are mailed annually to 
respondents. Nevertheless, some respondents still report they do not know what their 
Social Security benefits will be at early retirement age. More specifically, from Part C of 
Table 3, 28 percent of men from couple households, and 45 percent of women from 
couple households report not knowing their Social Security benefits at early retirement 
even when given the opportunity to provide an answer in the form of brackets.
 8 
There are similar results concerning benefits at normal retirement age. For men 
and women from couple households, the percent reporting DK are 23 percent and 40 
respectively.  
                                                 
8 In examining knowledge of Social Security benefits, Rohwedder and Kleinjans (2006) consider the 
changes in knowledge over time. They find that HRS respondents do better in reporting Social Security 
wealth as they approach retirement. They conclude that respondents who retired when they planned do a 
good job of reporting Social Security wealth. However, a minority misreports their wealth, with 17 percent 
of their sample over or understating their future benefits by 20 percent or more.    47






DK- Plan type  R doesn’t know plan type 
R and firm agree on all 
plan types (broad 
restriction) 
If self-rep=DB/comb& firm-rep=DB/comb or 
If self-rep =DC/comb & firm-rep =DC/comb 
Firm and R agree plan is 
DB  
Firm reports DB only, self-report DB only  
Firm and R agree plan is 
DC  
Firm reports DC only, self-report DC only 
Firm reports DC & self-rep 
DB 
Firm reports DC/comb, self-report DB/comb 
Firm reports DB & self-rep 
DC 
Firm reports DB/comb, self-report DC/comb 
DK-ER age for DB  R reports dk on the early retirement age for the most important 
DB/comb plan 
DK-NR age for DB  R reports dk on the normal retirement age for the most 
important DB/comb plan 
DK-ER age for DC  R reports dk on the early retirement age for the most important 
DC plan 
DK-DC balances  R reports dk on account balances for the most important DC 
plan 
DK after brackets in DC  R reports DK after bracket questions for DC account balances 
R & Firm agree on NR age  Firm-rep of normal retirement age agrees with self-report within 
ranges of 2 years for the most important DB/comb plan 
DK-XP benefits for DB  R reports dk on the benefits at expected age of retirement for 
the most important DB/comb plan 
R & Firm agree on 
expected DB benefits 
Firm-rep of benefits at expected age of retirement agrees with 
self-rep for the most important DB/comb plan 
DK-SS benefits at ER age   R reports dk on social security benefits at early retirement age  
DK-SS benefits at NR age   R reports dk on social security benefits at normal retirement age 
Current pension wealth  Sum of DB wealth and DC balances 
Current DB wealth  Self-rep expected DB benefits from current job 
Current DC wealth  DC balances from current job 
Cognition Variables 
TICS  Sum of series 7 and backward counting - Sum of correct 
answers, average for the missing 
Word recall  Average of immediate +delayed recall- Missing values replaced 
with the average 
Numeracy  Sum of dummies for 10% chance, winning lott, and interest on 




sTICS Spouse’s  tics 
sWord recall  Spouse’s Word recall 
sTotal numeracy  Spouse’s total numeracy  
Ddel  Dummy var for delayed recall 
Dimm  Dummy var for immediate recall 
dbwc20  Dummy var for backward counting 
dser7  Dummy var for series 7 
Mischnc  Dummy var for missing chance of getting disease 
Miswnn  Dummy for missing Winning lottery 
Misntrst  Dummy for missing interest on savings 
Other Covariates 
Public  Dummy for if public employee 
Mispubl  Dummy for missing public employee variable 
Dunion  Dummy for union employee 
Misunion  Dummy for missing union employee 
Dontwrk  Dummy for not working Rs 
Rage R’s  age 
Sage Spouse’s  age 
Rage squar  R’s age square 
Sage square  Spouse’s age square 
Total  income  Total household income -- used in wealth equations 
Total  income square  Total household income square -- used in wealth equations 
Female Dummy  for  gender   
Hispanic  Dummy var for hispanic 
Nonwhite  Dummy var for non-white 
Finr Financial  respondent 
Rschlyrs  R’s number of years of education -- used in wealth equations 
Sschlyrs  spouse’s number of years of education -- used in both wealth & 
knowledge equations 
Dropout  If did not finish high school -- used in knowledge equations 
Somecol  R has some college education -- used in knowledge equations 
Colgrad  R has a college degree -- used in knowledge equations 
Postgrad  R has more than a college degree -- used in knowledge 
equations 
Snopen  Dummy for spouse with no pension 
Snomatchspd  Dummy for spouse with no matched spd 
sswca50  SS wealth if claim now le 50k -- used in knowledge equations 
sswca100  SS wealth if claim now <= 100k > 50k -- used in knowledge 
equations 
sswca150  SS wealth if claim now <= 150k > 100k -- used in knowledge 
equations 





sswca201  SS wealth if claim now > 200k -- used in knowledge equations 
dmsswca  Dummy var for missing ss wealth at claim now age -- used in 
knowledge equations 
 
 
  
 